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In enhancement ethics, evolutionary theory has been largely perceived as 
supporting liberal views on enhancement, where decisions to enhance are 
predominantly regulated by the principle of individual autonomy. In this 
paper I critique this perception in light of recent scientific developments. 
Cultural evolutionary theory suggests a picture where individual interests 
are entangled with community interests, and this undermines the 
applicability of the principle of autonomy. This is particularly relevant for 
enhancement ethics, given how – I argue – decisions to enhance are often 
influenced by desires to increase social status. The “service view on 
enhancement”, based on principles of service and trust, is proposed as 
offering better guidance for the challenges of social living.   
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Although science may be neither necessary nor sufficient for ethical argumentation,  
evolutionary theory has played a prominent role in recent enhancement ethics. For 
instance, claims that enhancement should be constrained by a fixed human nature or by 
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givenness seem difficult to hold given how the human species evolved and continues to 
evolve.1  
Another evolutionary argument that seems to have gained particular currency 
appears to offer a direct, positive argument for enhancement. It appeals to the fact that 
humans evolved in hunter-gatherer environments but live in cosmopolitan and urbanized 
environments with which they are mismatched. This is a major hypothesis in evolutionary 
psychology and psychiatry, and is linked, for instance, to the widespread prevalence of 
some mental health disorders.2 In the context of enhancement ethics, the mismatch 
hypothesis is leveraged to argue that humans are so deeply maladapted, unable to rise to 
the challenges of cosmopolitan and multicultural environments, that only technological 
enhancement can ensure that humans are fit for the future. Hence many legal and 
institutional barriers constricting enhancement should be lifted, so that enhancements 
can be used in the quest for personal well-being.3 
It is striking how, through such arguments, evolutionary theory has broadly been 
perceived as supporting liberal views on enhancement, where decisions on whether to 
enhance or not are predominantly guided by the principle of individual autonomy. And 
while liberal views can range from the social liberal to the libertarian, in enhancement 
ethics, the center of gravity in recent literature has tended towards the latter. According 
to libertarian views, enhancements are to be judged as Millian “experiments in living”: as 
long as they do not actively harm others, they are ethically commendable expressions of 
individual autonomy.4  
A libertarian view on enhancement may not convince everybody, but it is not 
always easy to show where precisely the view goes wrong. For once one accepts that 
humans are deeply maladapted, it is very difficult to escape the logic of utilitarian 
reasoning, which leads inexorably to the conclusion of liberalizing enhancement in one 
way or another, if not through legal and institutional deregulation (the libertarian 
conclusion), then through fair, institution-backed administrations of enhancement (the 
social liberal conclusion).5 
My aim in this article is to undermine the starting point in this reasoning by 
drawing on cultural evolutionary theory. This shows how the role of the social and cultural 
environments has been unjustifiedly ignored or downplayed in recent enhancement 
ethics. The implication is an undermining of the fundamental presumption of liberal 
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views: a relatively strong distinction between the interests and decisions of the individual, 
and those of the community. It is just this distinction that is undermined given what we 
know about how our species evolved. As a very social species, our desires are significantly 
shaped by the norms and patterns of behavior of the community we inhabit. Our desires 
are not quite “our own”. 
One very concrete dynamic that illustrates this intertwining of individual and 
community is competition for social status. The desire for status, as we will see later, is 
fundamental motivator for humans, regardless of culture, gender, age, or even 
personality. Unsurprisingly, this motivator also appears across empirical studies on 
attitudes towards enhancement. From height enhancements to performance enhancing 
drugs and cognitive enhancement, decisions to enhance are often motivated by desires to 
increase social status – potentially leading to perverse status competition. 
This dynamic does not so much falsify liberal views as show them to be incomplete. 
I argue that neither the principle of no harm nor that of distributive justice gives 
satisfactory guidance to individuals navigating such status competition. Deliberations on 
whether to enhance thus require ethical resources not found among liberal views.   
What could be more promising instead? I propose the service view on 
enhancement, in which the dominant principle guiding individual decision making is not 
autonomy but service: not the “own” good and wellbeing in the strict sense, but the good 
and wellbeing of others and that of the community at large. This view is, I argue, more 
grounded on what we know about human evolution, and is also more in tune with the real 
concerns, anxieties, or competitive urges that members of communities must respond to. 
 
2. Evolution and Liberal Views of Enhancement  
 
Enhancement ethics is future oriented. It is about what humans might become. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, it has long been inspired by the science of what humans have 
been in the past—namely, evolutionary science. The old eugenics was strongly inspired by 
the 19th century understanding of the theory of natural selection;6 similarly, today’s 
enhancement ethics draws on two common evolutionary arguments. The first argument 
turns on the fact that evolution debunks (folk-psychological) essentialist understandings 
of human nature.7 There are simply no universal, unchanging properties that characterize 
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all members of the Homo sapiens. Hence enhancement technology is not changing 
anything that might not change anyway. Beliefs in (essentialist) human nature are 
ungrounded and should not constrain enhancement.8 Is this debunking of human nature 
definitive? Not necessarily. In the past decades there have been some attempts to 
resuscitate human nature as a scientifically legitimate concept.9 However, the resulting 
concepts of human nature are causal or descriptive concepts, void of moral significance.10  
A similar argument has also been applied to the concept of “givenness”.11 After all, 
humans have been technologically enhancing their “given” capacities since the dawn of 
the Homo genus about two million years ago. Our evolutionary history paints us as 
enterprising, autonomous individuals; there is no natural or given state of affairs to 
constrain human autonomy. Human enhancement is business as usual. 
If the first evolutionary argument supports the right to enhance, the second 
evolutionary argument – and the main focus of this paper – supports to duty to enhance. 
In brief: the vast majority of the evolution of the Homo genus (i.e., about 99.5% of the 
past 2 million years) took place in an environment of small-scale hunter-gatherer 
societies, and today human traits and human cognition remain designed for the specific 
challenges of that ancestral environment. This hypothesis has been used to great success 
in evolutionary psychology to explain common mate preferences, sexual taboos, and 
emotions,12 and why some mental disorders, such as major depressive disorder or 
attention deficit disorder, seem to be on the rise.13 This hypothesis has been used in 
enhancement ethics to provide an argument in favor of enhancement – or, at least, for 
enhancement of any trait that is not optimally adapted to the challenges of our urbanized, 
anonymous, and increasingly online living.  
Here is one concrete instance of this mismatch argument: 
 
After all, our brains are products of evolution, which is a blind process that hardly 
seeks to maximize the good, or make us morally best. Evolution ‘cares’ only about 
reproductive success. Moreover, even if the evolutionary process somehow led to 
what is in one sense an optimal result, this result may be optimal only in the 
environment in which our very distant ancestors lived. It is very unlikely to be 
optimal in our utterly different modern environment. (There was, for example, no 
police in the primeval savannas, nor were there planes or hijackers . . .)14  
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Other examples could be cited,15 and variations on this positive evolutionary argument 
have been widely adopted by prominent ethicists.16 
The mismatch argument works in part through its rhetorical force. One barrier to 
widespread acceptance of enhancements progress might lie in our evolved cognitive 
biases, such as biases towards the status quo,17 somewhat similar to how the eighteenth-
century philosopher Nicolas de Condorcet thought the barriers to human progress lay in 
“ignorance” and the “yoke” of political or religious authority.18 The mismatch argument 
creates the impression that liberal views of enhancement are situated within a larger 
family of liberal views that go back to the Enlightenment. The rhetorics of this association 
lies in the suggestion that, also today, the liberalization of enhancement must overcome 
similar trials in human obscurantism and irrationality. 
In terms of its logic, the mismatch argument seems to work in two ways. First, it 
shifts the utilitarian calculus in favor of enhancement: the current state of human 
phenotypes is very maladapted, and this maladaptedness is engrained in our genetic 
makeup, and hence the potential benefits from enhancement are very large. In other 
words, the argument supports “enthusiasm” for enhancement, where the relative benefits 
of enhancement are emphasized. 19 However, such a utilitarian calculus could also be used 
to justify a collectivist approach to enhancement, so the maladaptedness argument must 
do more than simply shift the utilitarian calculus in favor of a liberal (and specifically 
libertarian) view on enhancement. (Note that the argument for enthusiasm works best if 
human phenotypes are suboptimal, but not too suboptimal; if our desires and volitions 
are too deeply maladaptive, then the principle of individual autonomy is eroded and a 
societal decision to let the decision be made by hard data and algorithms will compel us 
to accept enhancement, perhaps even the radical enhancement of transhumanism.20) 
A second and more fundamental way in which the maladaptedness argument 
promotes a liberal view perhaps lies in how it paints a direct, simple, and intuitive view of 
humans and human evolution as “individual-centered”. In such a individual-centered 
view, adaptiveness is spelled out in terms of capacities of the individual – not social or 
moral norms, or social structures. The unit of selection is the individual, and the only 
processes considered are those concerning the individual and the individual’s direct 
environment.  
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The individual-centered view does not explicitly reject group selection or cultural 
evolution; it just ignores it. It is perhaps best understood as a certain interpretation of the 
evolutionary psychology of the 1980s and 1990s,21 and fits in well with approaches to 
defining well-being in terms of individual capacities and changes in well-being in terms 
of changes in "the biology or psychology of a person"22. This focus on the individual comes 
under pressure when we consider how entangled individual interests are with community 
interests. 
 
3. Social Status and the Decision to Enhance 
 
When a human and chimpanzee toddler are given the same spatial or causal task to solve, 
they do about as well (or rather, poorly). However, when it comes to social tasks, like 
imitating the human experimenter's solution of following their gaze, then the human 
toddler vastly outperforms the young chimpanzee.23 This phenomenon of imitation and 
social learning is the crucial feature of cultural evolutionary theory’s view on human 
evolution.24 The human evolutionary story is a story of social learning, in which 
knowledge and skills are transmitted from one individual to the next and from one 
generation to the next via social processes.25 Social learning is thought to be central for 
the dramatic geographic expansion and population growth of the human species.26 
This gives rise to what can be called the “group-centered view” of human evolution, 
in which the community or group is the central unit of selection, adapting to changes in 
the external environment and undergoing selective competition. Individuals develop in 
social-cultural environments, and the structure of the latter changes over time: new 
behavioral habits, moral norms, and technological know-how. The community affects 
individual reasoning and valying, which in turn affect social norms, and in this way, our 
actions in the private sphere – undertaken in our “experiments of living” – are proto-
public acts with ripple effects throughout the community. 
Social Status Norms. I will be arguing that one type of social norm in particular 
– status norms – seems to be highly relevant for understanding decisions to enhance. For 
this it is helpful to have some background in evolutionary perspectives on status, because 
the term “status” may evoke predominantly negative connotations today (oppression, 
privilege, structural violence, and so on).  From an evolutionary perspective, “status 
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differences” refers to ways of structuring a group of organisms so that intragroup conflict 
about access to resources is minimized. For example, the pecking order among chickens 
allows a group of chickens to work out which individual may peck at food first, which 
individual second, and so on, without physical conflict. Such hierarchies are widespread 
among mammals, birds, fish, as well as invertebrates 27 – and humans.  
The main difference between the human and other animal species lies in how 
human status hierarchies are determined not only by “dominance,” or the threat of force, 
but also by “prestige,” which is freely given to individuals in recognition of a high degree 
of competence in some activity.28 So humans have evolved ways of shaping status 
hierarchies so that status is assigned to the persons whom others can learn the most from, 
and also who might likely make the best decisions for the group. Status competition, as 
long as it is for prestige, need not be zero-sum, as it can lead to better services being 
rendered to the community. Prestige represents a prosocial way of organizing status 
hierarchies.  
However, like any moral innovation, it can be hijacked. High-status individuals 
hold sway over large swathes of the community, and hence at some later time they can, in 
principle, convert their social networks into coalitions to suppress a rival.29 Egotistic 
dominance behaviors lurk around the corner, even if status was originally freely conferred 
to the individual. Hence human societies are characterized by “service-for-prestige” 
norms: high-status individuals are expected to provide some form of service (expertise, 
risk, judgment, time) in exchange for prestige, and are punished if they fall afoul of the 
norms.30 
In this way, most if not all human cultures are characterized by a constellation of 
service-for-prestige norms – something that I will dub the “ethos of service” for purposes 
here. In reality, this ethos is, of course, not evenly distributed, and some communities 
have a weaker ethos of service than others. For instance, apparently the “dark triad” of 
dominance-related personality traits (Machiavellianism, narcissism, psychopathy) is 
significantly more prevalent among corporate and political leaders compared to the 
general population.31 Nonetheless, it is not wrong to deem an ethos of service as the norm 
for human populations. As suggested by very term "dark triad", the ethos of service is still 
held as a normative ideal even if it may not be realized. 
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Social Status and the Decision to Enhance. Imagine an enhancement that 
has as little to do as possible with social status – perhaps a hypothetical drug that allows 
one to blink “abnormally” fast, beyond species-typical limits. Why is there no industry 
researching and investing in breakthroughs for blinking drugs? Why are lawmakers and 
ethicists not debating the acceptability of such enhancements? Because nobody cares: 
nothing is at stake. Perhaps some biohacker might find some idiosyncratic interest in such 
enhancements, but it is hard to imagine such an enhancement being of any public 
interest.32 
Conversely, some of the most ethically controversial classes of enhancement 
directly or indirectly involve competition for status. The most straightforward example is 
height enhancement. Like almost all other animal species, humans unconsciously assign 
higher status to tall or large individuals.33 This bias shows up in various statistics, for 
instance in correlations between height and  military or corporate rank, or between height 
and income (Blaker et al. 2013). It also shows up in experimental psychology, with most 
marked effects on the judgment of males: taller males are perceived as possessing 
superior leadership, intelligence, and even health.34 
This privileging of height, contrary to appearances, is not merely a quirky vestige 
of our evolutionary past. In particular, it shows up in clinical studies and the ethics of 
“idiopathic short stature” – the condition of short stature without any underlying 
pathology. Some parents (consciously or not) view short stature as a “disadvantage in 
[the] child’s social life and career” or even as a “disability”.35 Perhaps in recognition of 
these lived realities, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration sanctions human growth 
hormone therapy when the child is in approximately the first percentile for height, even 
though the child may not be suffering from a growth hormone deficiency.  
What matters here is relative height, not absolute height. In fact, what has counted 
as “short” has fluctuated considerably over history,36 and the competition for relative 
height is an obvious instance of a zero-sum competition. So, to briefly anticipate the 
consequences for liberal views, one can already wonder to what extent parents are making 
an autonomous decision when they opt for human growth hormone therapy for a short 
child even if perfectly healthy. The parents are not being forced to enhance, but at the 
same time their calculus is driven by fears that their child will have to face bullying, being 
passed over for jobs and promotion, and so on.37 The decision is not “coerced” in any hard 
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sense, but the norms of the social-cultural environment are setting the parameters for the 
parents’ calculus, and one can only assume that most parents would decide differently if 
the costs of short stature were not so steep.  
A similar story can be told of performance enhancement. In a recent empirical 
study of the motivations of athletes to take performance enhancers,38 the most 
widespread motivations pertained directly athletic performance, even when it came at a 
cost to personal health. Why is athletic excellence desired? The researchers document that 
there are many second-order motivations that have to do social status: improving one’s 
social image, securing respect from others, gaining friends, obtaining what the 
researchers term “hero status”, getting more media attention, and acquiring financial 
gains. Once again, status norms in the social-cultural environment are setting the 
parameters for the decision whether to enhance.  
Some types of enhancement undertaken for aesthetic reasons may also have 
second-order motivations related to status. For instance, when anabolic steroids are used 
as a cosmetic enhancement to increase muscle mass, users point to aesthetic reasons and 
the desire for “enhanced confidence”.39 But why should having a muscular body be 
aesthetic or justify self-confidence? Basic evolutionary psychology tells us here that 
humans about muscle mass (at least in males) because, as a way of increasing one’s 
physical formidability, it increases perceived dominance status.40 
How deep is the link between motivations for enhancement and social status? The 
rationale for the link between enhancement and status is simply that an enhancement of 
some desirable capacity X can be used to either gain a competitive advantage over others 
with regards to X (in a competition for dominance) or to provide a better service to the 
community through X (and hence increased prestige). The capacity X need not be used in 
status competition; however, the reality is that social status represents one of the 
fundamental motivators for humans. In their review study, Cameron Anderson et al. even 
conclude that our evolved desire for status is a “universal” human motivator: it is 
discerned across cultures, genders, ages, and personalities.41 Given the centrality of the 
status motivation, and given how enhancements can be co-opted for status competition, 
one should not be surprised that motivations to enhance are often even be subordinated 
to status-related motivations. 
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One could wonder whether the observation holds for all types of enhancements. 
This depends in part on the definition of “enhancement”. Health-related interventions do 
not seem to have much to do with status: vaccinations stimulate adaptive immunity, and 
glasses correct for myopia. Whether such interventions should be categorized as 
enhancement or not is subject to disagreement: some would wish to preserve some 
distinction between “therapy” and “enhancement”.42 Relationship and love 
enhancements also would not seem to be motivated by status, but again, it’s debatable 
whether love drugs aim beyond species-typical norms or merely at achieving what is 
typically considered “healthy.” 43 
Despite these questions, it is safe to say that status seems central to the motivations 
for at least some types of enhancement technology. In such cases, given how individual 
interests are entangled with status norms (in which community interests are 
represented), the mismatch argument for enhancement seems much less plausible. 
Apparent mismatch may be the product of a suboptimal social and cultural environment 
– and wayward status hierarchies in particular. which may value properties such as “being 
taller than most others” or being more muscular or having shorter feet. The appropriate 
response is not enhancement, in order to better adapt to the environment, but rather 
social action to change the environment. 
This line of thought also casts doubt on the basic libertarian normative idea that as 
long as nobody else is harmed by an enhancement, a person should be free to undergo 
enhancement in any way they see fit. The problem is not that the libertarian idea is wrong 
but that it is fatally incomplete. It does not recognize that individuals desire some 
enhancements because they would improve status, and it does not consider that narrowly 
pursuing status can lead to zero-sum status competitions in which everyone is left worse 
off. The basic libertarian view has a blind spot about perverse status competition. 
 
4. Liberal Responses: No Harm and Justice 
 
The liberal approach to enhancement could be defended against this critique. The 
condition that enhancements must not harm others and a requirement for distributive 
justice, for example, might allow for liberal views to put limits on enhancements that are 
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aimed at gaining dominance status. However, the entanglement of individual and 
community interests turns out to be fundamentally problematic for any liberal view.  
Avoiding harm through moral enhancement. The first defense is the threat 
from perverse status competition constitutes a form of harm, and hence can motivate 
restrictions on individual autonomy. In fact, our unfortunate, status-oriented moral 
psychology could be taken as a reason for carrying out moral enhancement, in order to 
suppress our desires for dominance and promote our desires for service. Thus, a liberal 
proponent of enhancement might argue, the solution lies not in less enhancement but in 
more and better-targeted enhancement.  
Usually, moral enhancement is discussed as a potential response to exclusivist 
tendencies within our moral psychology: we tend to be negatively biased towards humans 
who do not belong to our “group”, defined by culture or ethnicity.44 The defense here 
applies similar considerations to the distinction between dominance and prestige status. 
Just as inclusivist morality has considerable precedent in human evolution, so do service-
for-prestige norms; even so, it could be argued that our concern for the latter could use a 
“boost by biomedical means”.45 Perhaps prosocial drugs could raise levels of prosocial 
hormones or neurotransmitters like oxytocin or serotonin, with the effect that low-status 
individuals would not make decisions based on a desire of dominance and such that high-
prestige individuals would use their position to obtain power and impose their wishes.  
Why this defense, upon reflection, does not seem attractive lies in the nature of the 
concept “service”. What does it mean to “serve” others, rather than to “seek dominance”? 
There is sometimes a fine line between service and the pursuit of social dominance. If the 
committee chair silences someone during a meeting, then the chair is using their position 
of dominance. However, it is not primarily dominance if the act of silencing is done out 
of service to the group – for instance if the person was speaking hatefully. But it would be 
a pure dominance display if the participant was silenced merely for presenting a 
dissenting opinion. This raises the question: who decides what service means, and with 
it, what behaviors are to be judged as mere displays of dominance and what as pro-social 
behaviors?   
Moreover, prosocial tendencies can end up supporting oppressive status norms. 
For instance, a moral reformer may be motivated by service and not by dominance, but 
may not be perceived as such by the majority if the reformer is viewed as "antisocial" and 
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as flouting social norms. In this way, the notion of "community interests" is ambiguous. 
Does it have to do with respecting preferences of immediate peers, or those of future 
generations? This question goes beyond the scope of this article, but the fact it arises 
shows how the further strengthening of service-for-prestige norms cannot be 
automatically obtained by pharmaceutically enhancing prosocial hormones or 
neurotransmitters. 
More ethically plausible, though less technologically plausible, would be a form of 
moral enhancement that directly improved moral decision-making – a chip or computer-
brain interface, perhaps. At least in theory, such an enhancement could help with the type 
of fine-grained decision-making under uncertainty required to promote service-for-
prestige norms. However, once the moral enhancement becomes powerful enough to 
actually guide decision-making, then the question arises of who would design such a 
moral enhancement? Which values would be programmed into the chip, which ethical 
principles? This response to the problem of perverse status competition thus seems to 
lead us very far away from the core libertarian idea, and towards, at best, a paternalistic 
social liberalism. However, in that case, the designers would need to possess some prior 
understanding of service-for-prestige norms in order to design such moral 
enhancements. So, for at least a segment of the population, the problem of perverse 
competition would not be solvable by moral enhancement. 
Distributive Justice. The second strategy is that of a social liberal who never 
would have subscribed to the libertarian idea in the first place: in this person’s view,  the 
danger of perverse competition is a familiar danger associated with positional goods and 
a strong rationale for regulation by public policy on grounds of distributive justice.46 In 
the social liberal’s view, the state and public institutions should step in to prevent the 
worst excesses of status competition and ensure a baseline of fair distribution of goods, 
so that basic rights and equality of opportunity are protected. Allen Buchanan and Russell 
Powell have recently argued that exclusionary tendencies in our moral psychology require 
correction through principles of distributive justice,47 and their argument can be 
expanded to address the challenges from enhancements that confer social dominance. 
In many important cases, this is the right response: when it is in the community’s 
interest to have a fair distribution of “social and economic advantages” accruing to 
individuals, principles of distributive justice can help address the problems of individual 
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autonomy that arise if enhancements conferred those advantages.48 However, the 
primary recipient of the advantages of enhancement is assumed here to be the individual. 
The community’s interests in the enhancement are secondary. Sometimes, however, an 
enhancement might be considered primarily as a gift to the community, and in these 
cases, principles of justice that equally distribute the enhancement are inappropriate. 
This can be illustrated with two contrasting examples. 
First, consider performance enhancing drugs. Do athletes take these to serve the 
community better? Interestingly, some have argued for that the use of enhancers by 
athletes is similar to the use of beta-blockers by classical musicians in that both kinds of 
drugs lead to better entertainment.49 According to this argument, enhancers promote an 
artistic service to the community, , and not merely a narrowly individual good. However, 
this does not seem to be the best way of understanding performance enhancement. Social 
goods do not seem to figure much at all in the athletes’ reasons for doping: they are more 
interested in achieving wealth or “hero status”50. In addition, the public seems to care 
more about relative performance than about absolute performance; we still celebrate 
winners even when records are not broken, and we enjoy youth and college leagues as 
much as professional leagues, even though the absolute performance may often be lower. 
Finally, the emphasis of sports-governing bodies on fairness51 in regulating doping use 
suggests that performance-enhancing drugs are viewed primarily as promoting narrowly 
individual goods.  
A contrasting example lies in cognitive enhancement. In the literature on this 
topic,52 education is often seen as the touchstone of a morally acceptable cognitive 
enhancement. However, if we focus on college and graduate school education, we see how 
cognitive enhancement inserts itself at the very heart of status hierarchies. This is why 
third-level education is ethically ambiguous in a way that shows the limits of distributive 
justice.  
Much academic education (consider law, medicine, psychology, or engineering) is 
directed toward entry into a profession. In fact, academia is often seen as an arena where 
rival professions carry out proxy conflicts over who can claim “expertise.”53 The close link 
between academia and high-status professions is one of the main reasons why educational 
attainment is so strongly positively correlated with life outcomes, whether one measures 
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that according to subjective well-being, self-esteem, or mental health,54 or even chance of 
disease, and mortality from all causes.55  
Many parents today recognize that education is a positional good. It is well 
documented how certain parents are more actively involved so that their children will 
gain access to status-enhancing educational institutions.56 The most common 
motivations cited are concern for the child’s future “well-being” and “success”, where the 
latter specifically means success in the competition for status.57 Moreover, the scarcer 
education is and the fewer highly educated people there are, the more higher education 
contributes more to subjective well-being.58  
Education, especially at a college level and beyond, sits uneasily on the dominance-
prestige divide. The competence it engenders can lead to better services being rendered 
to the community, in which case the society as a whole benefits. However, education can 
also be pursued for the sake of enjoying the privileges and benefits associated with status. 
If the latter are not subordinated to service, then the privileges become means to allow 
one’s individual preferences to weigh more strongly in the community: this is a subtle 
form of dominance. 
This dual nature of education is sometimes overlooked in the cognitive 
enhancement literature, but it is not new. In ancient Greece, when systematic education 
was still a relatively new development in human history, sophists and philosophers alike 
were viewed with suspicion. Thus Isocrates (436-338 BC) was charged with “corrupting 
the youth”: endowing them with rhetorical skill to gain an unfair advantage over peers 
during court trials or debates over policy. Socrates, of course, was charged and sentenced 
to death over the same “crime”; education, and the rhetorical and argumentative 
supremacy it afforded, was viewed with suspicion. Today, scientific experts and highly 
educated liberal elites are viewed with suspicion and distrust, and this distrust can be 
interpreted as reflecting a moral uncertainty: will the powerful cognitive enhancement 
that higher education represents be used for the benefit of the community, or to promote 
patterns of dominance? 
The fine line between dominance and prestige, and between privilege and service 
that is strongly apparent in higher education, means that this form of cognitive 
enhancement is both an individual good as well as a social good. This makes it difficult to 
regulate the dangers of perverse competition through the conceptual framework of public 
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policy and distributive justice. If we follow the latter, then tertiary education is 
conceptualized in terms of equality of opportunity. The problem is not that this is wrong, 
but that it is problematically incomplete: the main question is not who gets the powerful 
cognitive enhancement, but whether those who benefit from it use it for service or for 
dominance. Enhancement through tertiary education is not merely an individual good 
but also a social good. 
This is why professional ethics offers a better model for thinking about how 
cognitive enhancements should be regulated, where individual interests and community 
interests are so strongly entangled. Associations of physicians, lawyers, or psychologists 
do not regulate the conduct of their members in the way the International Cycling Union 
regulates cyclists in the Tour de France. There is, in general, considerably more trust in 
practicing professionals, not only from governing bodies, but also from the clients and 
customers of the professionals. Moreover, attempts at coercing service-oriented attitudes 
from individual members, whether through nudges or punishment, are often self-
defeating.59 This is why the self-regulation of professions is typically formulated more in 
terms of ethics rather than policy oriented towards justice: having an ethics oriented 
towards an ideal of service is, according to some sociologists, a defining characteristic of 
what professionalism means.60 Inequality is less of pressing issue: if a professional 
decides to undergo additional cognitive enhancement, they may indeed accrue further 
social status and privilege (as with the specialist physician who undergoes yet further 
specialization), but the expectation is that this increased competence will be put at the 
service of the community and that all will benefit. 
In sum, it should be acknowledged that some enhancements predominantly entail 
individual privilege: when this is the case (e.g. performance enhancing drugs), then the 
principle of distributive justice is applicable. However, important classes of enhancement 
such as cognitive enhancement, are not merely individual goods but also social goods. 
They involve both prosocial responsibilities as well as privileges. For such types of 
enhancement, a redistribution according to fairness principles may not prevent perverse 
competition from happening anyway. Instead, the appropriate response lies in 
strengthening the ethics of those undergoing enhancement. This is the basic idea 
underlying the service view on enhancement. 
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5. The Service View of Enhancement  
 
Let me recap the argument so far. Recent scientific developments in cultural evolutionary 
theory suggest a group-centered view of human evolution where the interests of the 
individual and community are intertwined, especially visible in how communities are 
structured  into status hierarchies which benefit both individuals and the community. 
Decisions to enhance are strongly influenced by status hierarchies and can lead to 
perverse competitions for dominance. This view casts doubt on the evolutionary rationale 
for the libertarian idea, namely that individuals need enhancement due to their deeply 
maladaptive evolved traits: the apparent mismatch may simply reflect their inability to 
adapt to social-cultural environments, and the fault may lie in wayward status 
hierarchies. It also casts doubt on the main libertarian idea that, unless direct harm is 
threatened, individuals should be left unperturbed to pursue their wellbeing as they see 
fit, and if that includes enhancing their capacities, then that should be endorsed.  
We cannot enhance our way out of perverse status competition. Perhaps school 
bullies can be pharmaceutically enhanced to stop bullying short children; however, the 
proper application of such moral enhancement presupposes that there are parents with a 
prior understanding of what is ethically desirable is needed. However, on a societal scale, 
there are no such "parents", at least if one holds to libertarian view. A social liberal view 
may seem more promising, by means of the principle of distributive justice. However, the 
principle of justice is only applicable to individual goods – when the goods are social in 
nature, then fair distributions among individuals can no longer be the guiding principle.  
Given how individuals are embedded in social networks characterized by status 
hierarchies, the proposal is that the real question lies not in how to maintain individual 
autonomy (either through negative liberty, no harm, or distributive justice), but rather on 
how to act in a way that benefits the community. To address this question, we might 
consider the service view of enhancement: since enhancements are tools to increase the 
competence and status of the individual, they should be judged according to how they 
allow for a service to the community and according to how they contribute to or detract 
from the ethos of service. 
The service view provides a response to the problem of perverse status 
competition, because, as long as an ethos of service is maintained, status competition 
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need not erode trust between individuals in a community. There can even be significant 
inequality, but when high-status persons act for the good of the community rather than 
for a more narrowly selfish good, then interpersonal trust can remain justified. One 
person’s success does not come at the cost of another’s defeat; on the contrary, if they are 
both part of the same community, the latter can benefit indirectly from the success of the 
former. 
In what way is the service view an alternative to liberal views? First it should be 
emphasized that the service view does not involve a jettisoning of the principle of 
autonomy: there is still a meaningful distinction to be made between making one’s own 
decisions and slavishly following what others say, do, or value. The service view is not an 
illiberal view. However, it is also not a liberal view. It does not endorse the dichotomy 
between private and public spheres:61 the ethos of service, as the set of prestige-for-service 
social norms, is situated in between the private and the public spheres. Neither are 
individuals conceptualized as self-determining agents: they are members of a community, 
and their ends may be significantly determined by the community they inhabit. 
Is the service view a form of communitarianism? Communitarianism is under-
stood in many different ways, and a full account is not possible here. Howeverif 
communitarianism implies that cultural traditions have intrinsic value,62 then the service 
view is not a form of communitarianism. Tradition is of value insofar it possesses time-
tested norms which may promote an ethos of service. However, tradition does not possess 
an intrinsic value that can take precedence over the needs of service. Another way of 
understanding the distinction is that the ethos of service defines a community through 
shared future rather than through a shared cultural ancestry.  
A second position often associated with communitarianism is that the community 
is considered as a subject with its own rights.63 By contrast, in the service view, the only 
real agency involved here is that of individuals: the ethos of service is a guiding principle 
for individual decision-making, and ultimately directed towards individual well-being. 
Paradoxically, the service view can be thought of a refinement of the fundamental values 
of liberalism – but refined to such a point that the principle of autonomy ceases to be 
useful. Service is a principle for individuals making decisions about their life course, 
where decisions are made on the basis of how one can contribute to the community. 
Service is not antithetical to individual well-being: in reality, one achieves well-being 
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precisely by being meaningful to other people. If well-being is the satisfaction of interests 
or preferences, then the principle of service allows one to discern what interests or 
preferences are worth satisfying.64  
Enhancement Ethics and Science. How should one, after all this, understand 
the role that cultural evolutionary theory has played in the argument presented here? My 
suggestion is that evolutionary science should not be thought of as preempting ethical 
reflection, but rather as presenting the ethicist with a wealth of information about the 
human condition, which can inform ethical reasoning. Cultural evolutionary theory 
allows the ethicists a better and more detailed understanding of some of the more subtle 
consequences of decisions to enhance, based on facts of our status-oriented moral 
psychology. Humans face anxieties, worries, impostor syndromes, insecurities, 
competitive urges and so on – all challenges that seem crucial concerning decisions to 
enhance. 
By arguing that a properly updated evolutionary perspective does not support 
liberal views, I did not argue that they are wrong or false. Rather, the implication is that 
liberal views, whether in social liberal or libertarian guise, just do not seem to offer 
meaningful guidance for the challenges that are inherent to being an individual who is 
also a member of a community. The challenges of anxieties, insecurities, competitiveness, 
and so on, would simply be categorized as obstacles to autonomy that the rational 
individual should ignore or avoid as much as possible. 
The option is still open for the liberal to simply repudiate our evolved moral 
psychology, and claim it needs to be overcome in some wholesale way. For instance, 
liberal could still maintain that the response to the challenging psychological realities lies 
in more enhancement – even if that ultimately will lead us away from liberalism and 
towards transhumanism, as explicitly endorsed by Yuval Harari.65 However, such a 
strategy would only serve to underline the main thesis of this article, namely, that the 
evolutionary perspective on enhancement does not support a liberal view (and not an 
illiberal view for that matter). 
Interestingly, common sense (in the form of “public opinion”) seems to follow what 
one would expect given cultural evolutionary theory. In a recent survey study, many 
participants judged the ethical acceptability of enhancement to depend on features in the 
social environment. For instance, if enhancement is used to intensify competition, it is 
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more likely to face disapproval, but if an enhancement technology is commonly used by 
peers or approved of by authority figures, then it is more likely to be positively evaluated.66 
Enhancement use by professionals such as surgeons or pilots meets more approval than 
does such use by students. Elsewhere I argue in more detail that these judgments are what 
one would expect if one takes our status-related motivations into consideration, and given 
that our judgments are guided by an ethos of service.67 Thus the service view, far from 
repudiating our evolved moral psychology as “irrational,” shows how there is an the 
ethical logic inherent to the service-for-prestige norms that have evolved throughout 
human history. 
 Enthusiasm or Caution? Proponents of liberal views of enhancement have 
often also been promotors of enhancement as such.68 Hence, in targeting liberal views, 
the service view will inevitably give the impression of being cautionary. The cautionary 
argument from service emphasizes that important classes of enhancement, including 
cognitive enhancements, can be used to increase dominance, and even if the enhancement 
does not cause any direct harm to others, over a longer period it can erode the ethos of 
service and lead to distrust. This cautionary argument does not underwrite an argument 
for prohibition, but for (moral) education, where service-for-prestige norms are 
communicated as ethical norms. Here the closest parallel lies with how professional 
bodies are supposed to self-regulate: through education and an adherence to a code of 
ethics, trust between professionals (and their clients) is maintained.  
Nonetheless, just as a liberal view can recommend caution if an enhancement 
threatens to erode individual autonomy,69 the service view could also support 
enthusiasm. If a proposed enhancement allows an individual to provide a better service 
to others, and does not lead that person to assume a position of dominance over others, 
then it is ethically commendable. Safety considerations are relevant, of course, but even a 
small amount of damage to the user may be outweighed by service. For instance, even if 
using amphetamines causes slight neuronal damage to pilots or surgeons, it could be 
ethically justified if it allows them to suppress sleep and to better serve their passengers 
or patients can thus be ethically approved. Obviously, there is a balance to be struck: 
taking a lethal enhancement to provide one act of service does not make for better service 
over a longer time-scale. In this way, the service view on enhancement can ground an 
alternative way of ethically deliberating about enhancement: one that is in principle 
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neither more enthusiastic or cautionary than the liberal view, but more grounded in what 
we know about both how humans originated, and about humans' actual desires for and 





How autonomous are our Millian experiments of living? To what extent are these 
driven by the community we inhabit, with its norms, values, and patterns of behavior? In 
this article, I drew on cultural evolutionary theory to show how the Darwinian 
competition for status has shaped our moral psychology, and a fortiori our decisions to 
enhance. The threat of perverse competition not only undermines evolutionary 
arguments for the liberal view on enhancement, but the very appropriateness of the liberal 
view. The principles of no-harm and of distributive justice are of limited help when faced 
with types of enhancement like cognitive enhancement which are positional social goods, 
and where the ethics (e.g., intention, orientation towards service) of the enhancer 
determines the ethics of the enhancement. By contrast, the service view on enhancement 
explicitly acknowledges the challenges of living in community, and has more in common 
with professional ethics rather than liberal political philosophy. Individuals in the West 
have been strongly influenced by the liberal focus on autonomy, but given our evolved 
moral psychology and underreported but clearly documented competition for status in 
liberal societies, the service view on enhancement appears to be an attractive alternative 




I would like to thank Erik Parens and Greg Kaebnick for useful feedback and for 
helpful conversations about enhancement, and Julian Savulescu and three 
anonymous referees for further feedback.  
 
1 E.g. J. Harris, Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better People (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2007); L. Kass, “Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Human 
Improvement,” President’s Council on Bioethics, Washington, DC, 2003; M. J. Sandel, The Case against 
 21 
 
Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2007). 
2 K. L. Syme and E. H. Hagen, “Mental Health Is Biological Health: Why Tackling ‘Diseases of the Mind’ Is 
an Imperative for Biological Anthropology in the 21st Century,” Yearbook of Physical Anthropology 171, 
no. S70 (2020): 87–117. 
3 I. Persson and J. Savulescu, Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement (OUP Oxford, 
2012). 
4 Variations on this idea present in: Harris, Enhancing Evolution; J. Savulescu, A. Sandberg, and G. 
Kahane, “Well-Being and Enhancement,” in Enhancing Human Capacities, ed. J. Savulescu, R. ter 
Meulen, and G. Kahane (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2014), 1–18; G. Kahane and J. Savulescu, 
“Normal Human Variation: Refocussing the Enhancement Debate,” Bioethics 29, no. 2 (2015): 133–43; N. 
Bostrom and A. Sandberg, “The Wisdom of Nature: An Evolutionary Heuristic for Human Enhancement,” 
in Philosophical Issues in Pharmaceutics, ed. D. Ho, vol. 122 (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2007), 
189–219; N. Agar, Liberal Eugenics: In Defence of Human Enhancement (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005). 
5 Notre that many if not all of these targeted authors do not explicitly endorse libertarianism and often in 
fact allow for individual autonomy to be constrained by the principle of distributive justice (see e.g. J. 
Savulescu, “Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children,” Bioethics 15, no. 5–6 
(2001): 413–26; Harris, Enhancing Evolution, at 30–31.. However, Robert Sparrow argues that the 
references to distributive justice are ad-hoc and that the label of “libertarian” is justified. (R. Sparrow, “A 
Not-So-New EUGENICS: Harris and Savulescu on Human Enhancement,” The Hastings Center Report 41, 
no. 1 (2011): 32–42.) For the purposes of this article, we need not be concerned with how 
precisely to place various authors on the spectrum of liberal views. 
6 G. Radick, “Darwinism and Social Darwinism,” in The Cambridge History of Modern European 
Thought, ed. W. Breckman and P. E. Gordon, vol. Vol.1, The Nineteenth Centiry, 2 vols., 2019, 279–3000. 
7 D. L. Hull, “On Human Nature,” Philosophy of Science 2 (1986): 3–13. 
8 Kass, “Beyond Therapy.” 
9 G. Ramsey, “Human Nature in a Post-Essentialist World,” Philosophy of Science 80, no. 5 (2013): 983–
93. 
10 E. Hannon and T. Lewens, Why We Disagree about Human Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2018). However,  value-laden concepts of human nature might subtly live on. See G. E. Kaebnick, 
Humans in Nature: The World as We Find It and the World as We Create It (New York, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2014). 
11 Sandel, The Case against Perfection; Harris, Enhancing Evolution. 
12 D. M. Buss, Evolutionary Psychology: The New Science of the Mind, 6th Edition (New York: Routledge, 
2019). 
13 Syme and Hagen, “Mental Health Is Biological Health.” 
14 Kahane and Savulescu, “Normal Human Variation,” 138. 
15 For direct quotes, consider for instance, N. Bostrom and T. Ord (“The Reversal Test: Eliminating Status 
Quo Bias in Applied Ethics,” Ethics 116, no. 4 (2006): 656–79) “… [O]ur current environment is in many 
respects very different from that of our evolutionary ancestors … [and] places very different demands on 
cognitive functioning than did an illiterate life on the savanna” (pp. 665-66). Or alternatively, J. Pugh, G. 
Kahane, and J. Savulescu (“Bioconservatism, Partiality, and the Human-Nature Objection to 
Enhancement,” The Monist 99, no. 4 (2016): 406–22): “.. the relatively contingent and arbitrary features 
of human nature, selected as they were blind evolutionary processes…” 
16 Bostrom and Ord, “The Reversal Test”; Persson and Savulescu, Unfit for the Future; Kahane and 
Savulescu, “Normal Human Variation”; Pugh, Kahane, and Savulescu, “Bioconservatism, Partiality, and the 
Human-Nature Objection to Enhancement”; B. D. Earp and J. Savulescu, Love Is the Drug: The Chemical 
Future of Our Relationships (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2020). 
17 Bostrom and Ord, “The Reversal Test”; L. Caviola et al., “Cognitive Biases Can Affect Moral Intuitions 
about Cognitive Enhancement,” Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience 8 (2014): 1–5. 
18 N. Urbinati and S. Lukes, Condorcet: Political Writings (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), at 70. 
19 E. Parens, Shaping Our Selves: On Technology, Flourishing, and a Habit of Thinking (Oxford : New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
20 Y. N. Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (New York: Vintage, 2017). 
 22 
 
21 David Buller distinguishes between “evolutionary psychology”, the scientific theory, and “Evolutionary 
Psychology”, the representation in wider academic circles and popular media. While the former makes 
narrow, testable predictions about certain cognitive process (e.g. about mate preferences, sexual taboos, or 
emotions as disgust: consult Buss, Evolutionary Psychology, the latter makes sweeping statements about 
all human traits. See D. J. Buller, Adapting Minds: Evolutionary Psychology and the Persistent Quest for 
Human Nature (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), at 881. 
22 Savulescu, Sandberg, and Kahane, “Well-Being and Enhancement,” 7. 
23 E. Herrmann et al., “Humans Have Evolved Specialized Skills of Social Cognition: The Cultural 
Intelligence Hypothesis,” Science 317, no. 5843 (2007): 1360–66. 
24 A seminal work in the development of cultural evolutionary theory is: R. Boyd and 
P. Richerson, Culture and the Evolutionary Process (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985). 
25 K. Sterelny, The Evolved Apprentice (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012). 
26 J. Henrich, The Secret of Our Success: How Culture Is Driving Human Evolution, Domesticating Our 
Species, and Making Us Smarter (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016). 
27 L. Ellis, “Dominance and Reproductive Success among Nonhuman Animals: A Cross-Species 
Comparison,” Ethology and Sociobiology 16, no. 4 (1995): 257–333. 
28 J. Henrich and F. J. Gil-White, “The Evolution of Prestige: Freely Conferred Deference as a Mechanism 
for Enhancing the Benefits of Cultural Transmission,” Evolution and Human Behavior 22, no. 3 (2001): 
165–96. 
29 M. van Vugt and J. M. Tybur, “The Evolutionary Foundations of Status Hierarchy,” in The Handbook of 
Evolutionary Psychology, ed. D. M. Buss (Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2015), p. 802. 
30 M. E. Price and M. Van Vugt, “The Evolution of Leader–Follower Reciprocity: The Theory of Service-for-
Prestige,” Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8 (2014): 1–17. 
31 Van Vugt and Tybur, “The Evolutionary Foundations of Status Hierarchy.” 
32 Except if, through the vagaries of fashion or the contingency of cultural evolution, the useless 
enhancement becomes a status signal. The custom of foot binding seems to be an example of this: foot 
binding is an “enhancement” in the sense of keeping adult foot size abnormally small, and despite coming 
at a terrible price, it nonetheless spread in historical Chinese societies in large part because it had become 
a status signal. 
33 L. Ellis, “The High and the Mighty among Man and Beast: How Universal Is the Relationship between 
Height (or Body Size) and Social Status?,” in Social Stratification and Socioeconomic Inequality: Vol. 2: 
Reproductive and Interpersonal Aspects of Dominance and Status, ed. L. Ellis (Westport, CT: Praeger, 
1994), 94–111. 
34 Van Vugt and Tybur, “The Evolutionary Foundations of Status Hierarchy”; N. M. Blaker et al., “The 
Height Leadership Advantage in Men and Women: Testing Evolutionary Psychology Predictions about the 
Perceptions of Tall Leaders,” Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 16, no. 1 (2013): 17–27. 
35 D. B. Allen, “Growth Promotion Ethics and the Challenge to Resist Cosmetic Endocrinology,” Hormone 
Research in Paediatrics 87, no. 3 (2017): 145–52, at 146. 
36 R. H. Steckel, “Stature and the Standard of Living,” Journal of Economic Literature 33, no. 4 (1995): 
1903–40. 
37 D. Redhead, J. Cheng, and R. O’Gorman, “Status Competition and Peer Relationships in Childhood,” in 
Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Science, ed. T. K. Shackelford and V. A. Weekes-Shackelford 
(Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018), 1–9. 
38 J. Kegelaers et al., “Incentives and Deterrents for Drug-Taking Behaviour in Elite Sports: A Holistic and 
Developmental Approach,” European Sport Management Quarterly 18, no. 1 (2018): 112–32. 
39 S. Wright, S. Grogan, and G. Hunter, “Motivations for Anabolic Steroid Use Among Bodybuilders,” 
Journal of Health Psychology 5, no. 4 (2000): 566–71. 
40 Buss, Evolutionary Psychology. 
41 C. Anderson, J. A. D. Hildreth, and L. Howland, “Is the Desire for Status a Fundamental Human Motive? 
A Review of the Empirical Literature.,” Psychological Bulletin 141, no. 3 (2015): 574–601. 
42 E. Juengst and D. Moseley, “Human Enhancement,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. 
N. Zalta, (2019). 
43 Earp and Savulescu, Love Is the Drug. 
44 A. Buchanan and R. Powell, The Evolution of Moral Progress: A Biocultural Theory (Oxford, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2018); I. Persson and J. Savulescu, “The Evolution of Moral Progress and 
Biomedical Moral Enhancement,” Bioethics 33, no. 7 (2019): 814–19. 
 23 
 
45 Persson and Savulescu, “The Evolution of Moral Progress and Biomedical Moral Enhancement,” 818. 
46 M. J. Mehlman and J. R. Botkin, Access to the Genome: The Challenge to Equality (Washington, D.C: 
Georgetown University Press, 1998); A. Buchanan et al., From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001); A. Buchanan, “Enhancement and the Ethics of 
Development,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 18, no. 1 (2008): 1–34. 
47 Buchanan and Powell, The Evolution of Moral Progress. 
48 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised edition (1971; repr., Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1999), at 53. 
49 J. Savulescu, B. Foddy, and M. Clayton, “Why We Should Allow Performance Enhancing Drugs in Sport,” 
British Journal of Sports Medicine 38, no. 6 (2004): 666–70. 
50 Kegelaers et al., “Incentives and Deterrents for Drug-Taking Behaviour in Elite Sports.” 
51 This can, for instance, read into the importance placed on the notion of a "level 
playing field". See for instance B. Kayser, A. Mauron, and A. Miah, “Current Anti-Doping Policy: 
A Critical Appraisal,” BMC Medical Ethics 8, no. 2 (2007). 
52 See for instance H. Greely et al., “Towards Responsible Use of Cognitive-Enhancing Drugs by the 
Healthy,” Nature 456, no. 7223 (2008): 702–5. 
53 A. Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1988). 
54 Anderson, Hildreth, and Howland, “Is the Desire for Status a Fundamental Human Motive?” 
55 R. G. Wilkinson, Mind the Gap: Hierarchies, Health and Human Evolution (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 2001); M. Marmot, Status Syndrome: How Your Social Standing Directly Affects 
Your Health (London: A&C Black, 2005). 
56 K. L. Fingerman et al., “Helicopter Parents and Landing Pad Kids: Intense Parental Support of Grown 
Children,” Journal of Marriage and Family 74, no. 4 (2012): 880–96. 
57 C. Segrin et al., “Parent and Child Traits Associated with Overparenting,” Journal of Social and Clinical 
Psychology 32, no. 6 (2013): 569–95. 
58 M. del M. Salinas-Jiménez, J. Artés, and J. Salinas-Jiménez, “Education as a Positional Good: A Life 
Satisfaction Approach,” Social Indicators Research 103, no. 3 (2011): 409–26. 
59 For an argument applied to professionalism in scientists, see H. Desmond, “Incentivizing Replication Is 
Insufficient to Safeguard Default Trust,” Philosophy of Science, no. 88 (2021): 1–12. 
60 E. Freidson, Professionalism, the Third Logic: On the Practice of Knowledge (University of Chicago 
Press, 2001); H. Desmond, “Professionalism in Science: Competence, Autonomy, and Service,” Science and 
Engineering Ethics 26, no. 3 (2020): 1287–1313. 
61 Buchanan et al., From Chance to Choice, at 378–80. 
62 D. Bell, “Communitarianism,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. N. Zalta, 2020. 
63 C. E. Baker, “Sandel on Rawls,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 133, no. 4 (1985): 895–928. 
64 The distinction between more and less valuable preferences has remained a difficult challenge for 
preference utilitarianism. See for example, M. C. Nussbaum, “Beyond ‘Compassion and Humanity’: Justice 
for Nonhuman Animals,” in Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions, ed. C. R. Sunstein and 
M. C. Nussbaum (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 299–320. 
65 Harari, Homo Deus. 
66 C. T. Dinh, S. Humphries, and A. Chatterjee, “Public Opinion on Cognitive Enhancement Varies across 
Different Situations,” AJOB Neuroscience 11, no. 4 (2020): 224–37. 
67 H. Desmond, “Service and Status Competition May Help Explain Perceived Ethical Acceptability,” AJOB 
Neuroscience 11, no. 4 (2020): 258–60. 
68 Parens, Shaping Our Selves. 
69 For an example, see J. Harris and S. Chan, “Moral Behavior Is Not What It Seems,” Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences 107, no. 50 (2010): E183–E183. 
